Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations by HE, Wei & LI, Jiangtao
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
5-2016
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with
interdependent valuations
Wei HE
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Jiangtao LI
Singapore Management University, jtli@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economic Theory Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HE, Wei and LI, Jiangtao. Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations. (2016). Games and Economic Behavior. 97,
166-173. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198
Games and Economic Behavior 97 (2016) 166–173
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Games and Economic Behavior
www.elsevier.com/locate/geb
Note
Eﬃcient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent 
valuations✩
Wei He a, Jiangtao Li b
a Department of Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
b Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 30 July 2015
Available online 3 May 2016
JEL classiﬁcation:
D82
D86
Keywords:
Dynamic mechanism design
Eﬃciency
Observable payoff
Incentive compatibility
Budget balance
This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving 
private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an 
eﬃcient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period 
of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent 
observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends 
the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
An important strand of mechanism design theory is concerned with the design of eﬃcient mechanisms. The mechanism 
designer would like to allocate the good to the bidder with the highest valuation,1 provide the public good if and only if 
the sum of the agents’ valuations is greater than the cost, and facilitate trading if and only if the buyer’s valuation is higher 
than the seller’s valuation, etc.2
The renowned Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism established the existence of an eﬃcient, incentive-compatible 
mechanism for a general class of static mechanism design problems with private values and quasilinear preferences; see 
Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) and Vickrey (1961). Subsequently, a pair of classic papers, Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont 
and Gérard-Varet (1979) (AGV), constructed an eﬃcient, incentive-compatible mechanism in which the transfers were also 
budget-balanced, using the solution concept of Bayesian–Nash equilibrium, under the additional assumption that private 
information is independent across agents.
✩ We are grateful to the Editor and an anonymous referee for the comments and suggestions. We thank Rabah Amir, Tilman Börgers, Yi-Chun Chen, Huiyi 
Guo and Satoru Takahashi for helpful discussions. All remaining errors are our own.
E-mail addresses: he.wei2126@gmail.com (W. He), jasonli1017@gmail.com (J. Li).
1 A leading rationale for the widespread privatization of state-owned assets is to enhance eﬃciency; see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). For example, the U. 
S. Congress explicitly mandated the Federal Communications Commission to promote eﬃciency in its auctions of frequency bands for telecommunications.
2 The problem of implementing socially eﬃcient outcomes has also been extensively studied in the dynamic setting; see, for example, Bergemann and 
Välimäki (2010), Athey and Segal (2013), and Guo and Hörner (2015). Pavan et al. (2014) provide a general treatment of the dynamic mechanism design 
problem in the independent private-value setting (see also references therein).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008
0899-8256/© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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In dynamic mechanism design problems with private values, Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) and Athey and Segal (2013)
have successfully addressed this question, by means of dynamic extensions of the VCG and AGV mechanisms. However, it 
is well known that VCG and AGV mechanisms no longer work in settings with interdependent valuations. Indeed, Maskin
(1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have demonstrated, in increasing generality, that if 
information signals are statistically independent, multidimensional (or, if they are single dimensional, but a single crossing 
condition is violated), and interdependent, then the implementation of eﬃcient mechanisms is generically impossible.
In this paper, we study eﬃcient mechanism design in a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and 
evolving private information. Our aim is to construct an eﬃcient, incentive-compatible dynamic mechanism that is also 
budget-balanced in every period of the game. As in the AGV mechanism and Athey and Segal (2013), we place emphasis on 
budget balance.
As discussed above, implementation of eﬃcient mechanisms with interdependent valuations runs into diﬃculties even 
in the static setting. To overcome such diﬃculties, we extend the following insight from Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic 
setting. In a static mechanism design problem, Mezzetti (2004) constructs a novel and elegant “generalized (or two-stage) 
Groves mechanism” that bypasses the above diﬃculties, with the assumption that each agent observes her own realized 
outcome-decision payoff after the ﬁnal outcome decision, but before ﬁnal transfers, are made.3 While Mezzetti (2004)
resolves incentive compatibility, requiring agents to be able to observe their own payoffs before the mechanism ends is a 
strong assumption in the static setting from an applied perspective. In the dynamic setting, it may seem natural to assume 
that in each period, each agent could observe her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period.
This assumption is related to the literature on contingent payments; see Hansen (1985), Crémer (1987), Samuelson
(1987) and more recently, DeMarzo et al. (2005) and Che and Kim (2010) among others.4 In this paper, we do not require 
that the realized outcome-decision payoffs be observable to the mechanism designer, but we rely instead on the agents’ 
reports of their own realized payoffs.
This paper places emphasis on budget balance in every period of the game.5 Indeed, the construction of an eﬃcient, 
incentive-compatible mechanism is straightforward. In each period, the mechanism designer makes a transfer to each agent 
that is an adjusted amount of the sum of the other agents’ outcome-decision payoffs from the previous period. This suﬃces 
to make each agent the residual claimant of the social surplus and provide the agents with the incentive to be truthful 
as long as the mechanism prescribes an eﬃcient decision rule. Under the assumption of independent types, we show that 
dynamic eﬃciency can be achieved with balanced budget. As in the AGV mechanism and Athey and Segal (2013), our 
construction of the budget-balanced mechanism requires all the other agents to pitch in to pay each agent’s incentive term. 
This ensures that the budget is balanced in every period of the game. The key difference between our mechanism and the 
“balanced team mechanism” in Athey and Segal (2013) is as follows. In their paper, only the transfers of the most recent 
two periods are relevant for each agent’s incentive in the current period, since the expectation of the transfers afterwards 
is zero.6 However, in our mechanism, all the future transfers could inﬂuence the incentive of the current period.
Another approach that studies eﬃcient mechanism design exploits the correlation of private information; see the seminal 
contribution of Crémer and McLean (1988) in the static setting. More recently, Liu (2014) and Noda (2015) extend the 
insight of Crémer and McLean (1988) to the dynamic setting and construct eﬃcient and incentive-compatible mechanisms 
respectively. These results leverage on the inter-temporal correlation of private information and do not apply in our setting. 
Hörner et al. (2015) apply a similar technique to dynamic Bayesian games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 constructs the eﬃcient, incentive-
compatible and budget-balanced mechanism and Section 4 concludes.
2. Model
2.1. Setup
Notation. We consider a dynamic mechanism design environment with interdependent valuations in a discrete-time, 
inﬁnite-horizon model. There is a ﬁnite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of risk neutral agents. Time is discrete, indexed by t ∈ N =
{0, 1, 2, . . .}. The state of the world θ it for agent i is a general Markov process on the state space i . The aggregate state 
is given by the vector θt = (θ1t , θ2t , . . . , θ It ) with  =
∏
i∈I i . Write θ
−i
t ∈ −i =
∏
j =i  j for the state of all agents except 
agent i. The outcome space is a measurable set X endowed with the σ -algebra X . The initial state θ0 ∈  is assumed to be 
publicly known. The current state θt ∈  and current decision xt ∈ X deﬁne a probability distribution for state variable θt+1
on  by the law of motion Q (·|xt , θt).
Timing. We consider mechanisms in which, following a publicly observed initial state θ0 ∈ , a decision x0 ∈ X is made. 
Then in each period t ≥ 1, each agent privately observes her type θ it ∈ i . Agents make reports simultaneously and a public 
3 Two-stage mechanisms can also be used to achieve goals other than eﬃciency (e.g., surplus extraction); see Mezzetti (2007).
4 Lehrer (1992) and Tomala (1999) have also adopted similar assumptions of observable payoff in the environment of repeated games.
5 Nath et al. (2015) study eﬃcient and incentive compatible mechanisms in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and observable 
payoffs, but the issue of budget balance is not addressed therein.
6 See the proof of Proposition 2 in Athey and Segal (2013).
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decision xt ∈ X is made at the end of each period. Each agent i also receives a transfer yit ∈ R. We assume that the past 
reports of each agent and the public decision are observable to all agents. All agents discount the future with a common 
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Interdependent valuations. We allow agents to have interdependent valuations in the sense that agent i’s payoff could 
depend on the signals of all the other agents for each i ∈ I . If a sequence of types {θt}t≥0 is realized, a sequence of public 
decisions {xt}t≥0 and transfers {yt}t≥0 are determined, then the discounted payoff of agent i is∑
t≥0
δt[ui(xt, θt) + yit],
where ui : X ×  → R is assumed to be measurable and bounded. We will refer to ui as the outcome-decision payoff of 
agent i.
Independent types. Throughout this paper, we shall assume independent types. That is, conditional on decisions, the 
private information of agent i does not have any direct effect on the distribution of the current and future types of other 
agents (we still allow one agent’s reports to affect the future types of other agents through the implemented decisions). 
More formally,
Deﬁnition 1. Agents have independent types if given any xt ∈ X and θt = (θ1t , θ2t , . . . , θ It ) ∈ , the transition probability 
Q (·|xt , θt) = ⊗i∈I Q i(·|xt , θ it ), where Q i(·|xt, θ it ) is a transition probability from X × i to (i).
Equilibrium notion. The truthtelling strategy of agent i always reports her state θ it in every period t ≥ 1 truthfully, 
regardless of the observed past (in particular, regardless of whether she has lied in the past). We will consider perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in truthtelling strategies, with beliefs that assign probability 1 to the other agents’ latest reports 
being truthful.
2.2. Eﬃciency
A social policy is a measurable function χ :  → X , where χ(θ) represents the decision made when the realized state in 
this period is θ . Starting from an initial type θ0 ∈ , a social policy χ together with the transition probability Q uniquely 
determine a probability measure over the sequence of states (θt)t≥0 ∈ N .
In period t , eﬃciency can be obtained at type θt by maximizing the discounted expected surplus:
sup
{xs}s≥t
E
[∑
s≥t
δs−t
∑
i∈I
ui(xs, θs)
]
.
We characterize the eﬃcient social policy χ∗ :  → X and the associated social value function V :  →R by the follow-
ing recursion using the principle of dynamic programming:
V (θ) = v(θ) + δ
∫

V (θ˜ )Q (dθ˜ |χ∗(θ), θ)
= sup
x∈X
⎡
⎣∑
i∈I
ui(x, θ) + δ
∫

V (θ˜ )Q (dθ˜ |x, θ)
⎤
⎦ ,
where v(θ) =∑i∈I ui(χ∗(θ), θ).7
3. Mechanism
In this section, we construct an eﬃcient and budget-balanced dynamic mechanism such that truthtelling strategies form 
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As discussed in the introduction, we assume that in each period, each agent observes her 
own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period.
Assumption. In each period t+1 (t ≥ 1) and for any xt ∈ X , each agent i observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff 
from period t .
For simplicity of exposition, in what follows, we go one step further and assume that in each period, the realized 
outcome-decision payoffs from the previous period are observable to the mechanism designer. The mechanism we construct 
7 Throughout this paper, we assume that the eﬃcient social policy exists.
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still works under the original assumption. Indeed, in each period t + 1, the mechanism designer could require the agents to 
report their realized outcome-decision payoffs from period t . Since for each agent i, the report of her own outcome-decision 
payoff does not affect her utility, we can assume that agent i truthfully reports her outcome-decision payoff from the 
previous period; see Mezzetti (2004) for further discussions.
In period t ≥ 1, given reported types rt−1 and rt in periods t − 1 and t respectively,8 let
i(rt−1, rit) =
∫
−i
V (rit, θ˜
−i
t )Q−i(dθ˜
−i
t |χ∗(rt−1), r−it−1) −
∫

V (θ˜t)Q (dθ˜t |χ∗(rt−1), rt−1) and
i(rt−1, rt) = i(rt−1, rit) −
1
I − 1
∑
j =i
 j(rt−1, r jt )
for each i ∈ I .
From the mechanism designer’s perspective, i(rt−1, rit) characterizes the change in the expected social value if agent i
reports rit in period t , given the report rt−1 in period t − 1.
Construct the following mechanism (χ∗, y):
1. The socially eﬃcient policy χ∗ is implemented in every period; that is, in period t , the allocation is χ∗(rt) based on 
the reports rt .
2. For each i ∈ I , the transfer to agent i in period t + 1 (for t ≥ 1) is
yit+1 =
1
δ
∑
j =i
w jt −
I − 1
Iδ
[v(rt) − i(rt−1, rt)] ,
where w jt = u j(χ∗(rt), θt) is the realized outcome-decision payoff of agent j ∈ I in period t , and v(rt) =∑
i∈I ui(χ∗(rt), rt).9
As in the AGV mechanism and Athey and Segal (2013), our mechanism requires all the other agents to pitch in to pay 
each agent’s incentive term, which ensures that the budget is balanced on the equilibrium path.
Theorem 1. Truthtelling strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the mechanism (χ∗, y). Furthermore, on the equilibrium 
path, the mechanism (χ∗, y) is budget-balanced in every period of the game.
Proof. The logic of the proof is summarized as follows. Step 1 begins by considering a simpler mechanism (χ∗, z) where 
the transfer zit to agent i is an adjusted amount of the sum of the realized outcome-decision payoffs of all the other 
agents in period t − 1. We show that truthtelling strategies form a PBE in this mechanism. The idea, as in the standard 
VCG mechanism, is to make each agent the residual claimant of the full surplus. Step 2 proves that the expected present 
value of agent i’s gain from deviating in the mechanism (χ∗, y) is the same as in the simple mechanism (χ∗, z). Therefore, 
truthtelling strategies still form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the mechanism (χ∗, y). Lastly, Step 3 veriﬁes that on the 
equilibrium path, the mechanism (χ∗, y) is budget-balanced in every period of the game.
Step 1. We consider a simpler mechanism (χ∗, z) where the allocation rule is still the eﬃcient social policy χ∗ , but 
the transfer agent i receives in period t ≥ 2 is zit = 1δ
∑
j =i w
j
t−1, where (w1t−1, w2t−1, . . . , wIt−1) are the realized outcome-
decision payoffs in period t − 1.10 By the one-stage deviation principle, to verify PBE it suﬃces to show that a one-stage 
deviation of any agent i ∈ I to reporting any rit ∈ i instead of her true type θ it ∈ i in period t is unproﬁtable. If all agents 
choose the truthtelling strategy, then the expected discounted payoff of agent i in period t is
ui(χ
∗(θt), θt) + zit +E
⎡
⎣∑
k≥1
δk(ui(χ
∗(θt+k), θt+k) + zit+k)|χ∗(θt), θt
⎤
⎦
= ui(χ∗(θt), θt) + zit +E
⎡
⎣∑
k≥1
δk(ui(χ
∗(θt+k), θt+k) + 1
δ
∑
j =i
u j(χ
∗(θt+k−1), θt+k−1))|χ∗(θt), θt
⎤
⎦
=
∑
j∈I
u j(χ
∗(θt), θt) + zit +E
⎡
⎣∑
k≥1
δk
∑
j∈I
u j(χ
∗(θt+k), θt+k)|χ∗(θt), θt
⎤
⎦
8 Since the initial state θ0 ∈  is publicly known, we assume r0 ≡ θ0.
9 We let yi0 = yi1 ≡ 0 for each agent i ∈ I .
10 We let zi0 = zi1 ≡ 0 for each agent i ∈ I .
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= V (θt) + zit .
Suppose that agent i reports rit instead. Let x = χ∗(rit , θ−it ). Then her expected discounted payoff in period t is
ui(x, θt) + zit +E
⎡
⎣∑
k≥1
δk(ui(χ
∗(θt+k), θt+k) + zit+k)|x, θt
⎤
⎦
= ui(x, θt) + zit +E
[∑
k≥2
δk(ui(χ
∗(θt+k), θt+k) + 1
δ
∑
j =i
u j(χ
∗(θt+k−1), θt+k−1))
+ δ(ui(χ∗(θt+1), θt+1) + 1
δ
∑
j =i
u j(x, θt))|x, θt
]
=
∑
j∈I
u j(x, θt) + zit +E
⎡
⎣∑
k≥1
δk
∑
j∈I
u j(χ
∗(θt+k), θt+k)|x, θt
⎤
⎦
=
∑
j∈I
u j(x, θt) + zit + δ
∫

V (θ˜ )Q (dθ˜ |x, θt).
Since V is the social value function when the decision policy is χ∗ , we have
V (θt) =
∑
j∈I
u j(χ
∗(θt), θt) + δ
∫

V (θ˜ )Q (dθ˜ |χ∗(θt), θt)
≥
∑
j∈I
u j(x, θt) + δ
∫

V (θ˜ )Q (dθ˜ |x, θt).
Thus, a one-stage deviation of any agent i ∈ I to reporting any rit ∈ i instead of her true type θ it ∈ i in period t is 
unproﬁtable. Truthtelling strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Step 2. We prove that the expected present value of agent i’s gain from deviating in the mechanism (χ∗, y) is the same 
as in the simple mechanism (χ∗, z).
In period t−1, consider the case where the true type proﬁle is θt−1 and the reported type proﬁle is (r− jt−1, θ jt−1) for some 
j ∈ I . That is, agent j truthfully reports θ jt−1 ∈  j while the other agents arbitrarily report r− jt−1 ∈ − j . We have∫
 j
 j(r
− j
t−1, θ
j
t−1, θ˜
j
t )Q j(dθ˜
j
t |χ∗(r− jt−1, θ jt−1), θ jt−1)
=
∫
 j
∫
− j
V (θ˜ jt , θ˜
− j
t )Q− j(dθ˜
− j
t |χ∗(r− jt−1, θ jt−1), r− jt−1)Q j(dθ˜ jt |χ∗(r− jt−1, θ jt−1), θ jt−1)
−
∫

V (θ˜t)Q (dθ˜t |χ∗(r− jt−1, θ jt−1), r− jt−1, θ jt−1)
= 0,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of i .
Thus, for each agent i ∈ I , if all the other agents truthfully report their types, then the expectation of the term ∑
j =i  j(rt−1, r
j
t ) in i(rt−1, rt) is 0 (from agent i’s perspective) regardless of her own report. In other words, if agent i
assigns probability 1 to the event that all the other agents truthfully report their types, then the term 
∑
j =i  j(rt−1, r
j
t ) in 
the transfer yit+1 cannot distort her incentive.
Next we consider other terms v(rt) − i(rt−1, rit) in the transfer yit+1 that could potentially distort agent i’s incentives. 
Suppose that all the other agents adopt the truthtelling strategy; that is, r−it−1 = θ−it−1 in period t − 1. As for agent i, her 
past types are payoff-irrelevant since (1) the past types do not enter into her future outcome-decision payoff functions 
and transfers; and (2) her belief about the opponents’ current types depends on her report, but not the true type, in the 
previous period. As a result, we can assume that agent i truthfully reports in period t − 1. We focus on the case that the 
true type of agent i is θ it but she reports r
i
t in period t .
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In what follows, we consider the summation of the expectation of v(rt+k) − i(rt+k−1, rit+k) for k ≥ 0 (from agent i’s 
perspective). If agent i deviates from θ it to r
i
t , we have∫
−i
v(rit, θ˜
−i
t )Q−i(dθ˜
−i
t |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) − i(θt−1, rit)
+
∑
k≥1
δk
∫
−i
E
(
v(θ˜t+k)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), θ it , θ˜−it
)
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1)
−
∫
−i
E
(
i(r
i
t, θ˜
−i
t , θ˜
i
t+1)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), rit, θ˜−it )
)
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1)
−
∑
k≥2
δk
∫
−i
E
(
i(θ˜t+k, θ˜ it+k)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), rit, θ˜−it )
)
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1)
=
∫
−i
v(rit, θ˜
−i
t )Q−i(dθ˜
−i
t |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (1)
−
∫
−i
V (rit, θ˜
−i
t )Q−i(dθ˜
−i
t |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (2)
+
∫

V (θ˜t)Q (dθ˜t |χ∗(θt−1), θt−1)
+
∑
k≥1
δk
∫
−i
E
(
v(θ˜t+k)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), θ it , θ˜−it
)
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (3)
−
∑
k≥1
δk
∫
−i
E
(
V (θ˜t+k)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), θ it , θ˜−it )
)
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (4)
+ δ
∫
−i
E
(
V (θ˜t+1)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), rit, θ˜−it )
)
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (5)
+
∑
k≥2
δk
∫
−i
E
(
V (θ˜t+k)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), θ it , θ˜−it )
)
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (6)
=
∫
−i
[
v(rit, θ˜
−i
t ) − V (rit, θ˜−it ) + δE
(
V (θ˜t+1)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), rit, θ˜−it )
)]
Q−i(dθ˜−it |χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (7)
+
∫

V (θˆt)Q (dθ˜t |χ∗(θt−1), θt−1)
+
∑
k≥1
δk
∫
−i
E
[
v(θ˜t+k) − V (θ˜t+k) + δV (θ˜t+k+1)|χ∗(rit, θ˜−it ), θ it , θ˜−it )
]
Q−i(dθ˜t(−i)|χ∗(θt−1), θ−it−1) (8)
=
∫

V (θ˜t)Q (dθ˜t |χ∗(θt−1), θt−1). (9)
The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of i . Terms (1), (2), (5) aggregate to term (7) and terms (3), (4), (6)
aggregate to term (8) respectively. It is easy to see that both terms (7) and (8) are equal to zero. Finally, (9) does not 
depend on agent i’s report.
Therefore, the transfer scheme y together with χ∗ provides each agent the same expected gain from deviating as the 
simple mechanism (χ∗, z). Since truthtelling strategies form a PBE in the latter mechanism, truthtelling strategies also form 
a PBE if the mechanism (χ∗, y) is adopted.
Step 3. We show that in the mechanism (χ∗, y), the transfers yit+1 balance the budget on the equilibrium path; that is, ∑
i∈I yit+1 = 0. On the equilibrium path, agents truthfully report their types, rt = θt and wit = ui(χ∗(θt), θt). We have
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∑
i∈I
yit+1
=
∑
i∈I
⎡
⎣1
δ
∑
j =i
w jt −
I − 1
Iδ
[v(θt) − i(θt−1, θt)]
⎤
⎦
= 1
δ
⎡
⎣∑
i∈I
∑
j =i
w jt −
∑
i∈I
I − 1
I
[v(θt) − i(θt−1, θt)]
⎤
⎦
= 1
δ
⎡
⎣∑
i∈I
∑
j =i
w jt −
∑
i∈I
I − 1
I
v(θt)
⎤
⎦
= 1
δ
⎡
⎣∑
i∈I
∑
j =i
u j(χ
∗(θt), θt) − (I − 1)
∑
i∈I
ui(χ
∗(θt), θt)
⎤
⎦
= 0,
where the third equality is due to the following:∑
i∈I
i(θt−1, θt) =
∑
i∈I
i(θt−1, θ it ) −
1
I − 1
∑
i∈I
∑
j =i
 j(θt−1, θ jt ) = 0. 
Remark 1. Consider the case that every state is absorbing; that is, Q (θ |x, θ) = 1 for each x ∈ X and θ ∈ .11 In this case, the 
eﬃcient social policy in our mechanism is simply the eﬃcient policy in the static setting, and the corresponding transfer is 
an adjusted amount of the transfer in the static environment (see Mezzetti, 2004, page 1623), where the adjustment is due 
to the discount factor. In particular, in our mechanism (χ∗, y), (1) the transfer y is adjusted by the discount factor δ, and 
(2) the construction of y depends on the continuation value V , which equals v1−δ when every state is absorbing.
4. Conclusion
In a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information, we construct an eﬃcient, 
incentive-compatible dynamic mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. To overcome the 
diﬃculties with interdependent valuations, we assume that in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-
decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting.
We conclude with several observations. Firstly, our result can be generalized to the case where each agent only ob-
serves her own realized outcome-decision payoff after any ﬁnite number of periods. Secondly, we see no diﬃculties in 
extending our result to the case of time-dependent payoffs. This allows us to cover ﬁnite-horizon environments and in 
particular, Mezzetti (2004). Finally, in dynamic mechanism design problems with private values, the assumption that each 
agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff is trivially satisﬁed. Therefore, our result can also be viewed as a 
construction of an eﬃcient, incentive-compatible and budget-balanced mechanism in this setting.
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